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<br />tion, executors' fees, attorneys' fees, and court costs, have been paid in full, except the claim
<br />of Lloyd H.Faidley, which was filed, contested, and allowed, and which is hereinafter more fully
<br />referred to.
<br />The Court finds that there was a contest upon the claim of Lloyd H.Faidley, which was allowed
<br />by the County Court in the sum of $22,600 principal and $9944 interest, and that the allowance
<br />of said claim by the County Court was appealed from it by the Executors to the District Court of
<br />Hall County, Nebraska, and said claim was in said District Court on the 7th day of February, 1941,
<br />allowed in the sum of $22,600, with six per cent. interest from May 1, 1933, $10,525, total
<br />$33,125, bearing six per cent. interest from the 5th day of February, 1941.
<br />The Court further finds that there was a dispute involving the legacy provided for in Paragraph
<br />Fifth of the last will and testament of Harry C.Faidley, deceased, whether said Lloyd H.Faidley
<br />was entitled, in addition to the 100 shares of J.C.Penney Company stock, to the dividends since
<br />the date of the death of Harry C.Faidley and whether, because of a certain split —up thereof by the
<br />J.C.Penney Company, he was entitled to 300 shares or 100 shares.
<br />The Court finds that there was a dispute with reference to Paragraph Sixth, whether or not
<br />Della Faidley was entitled to 100 shares of the common stock of the J.C.Penney Company, because
<br />of the provisions contained in Paragraph Tenth of said last will and testament, and in the event
<br />she was entitled to said stock, whether she would be entitled to dividends since the date.of the
<br />death of Harry C.Faidley, and whether she would be entitled to 300 shares instead of 100 shares,
<br />on account of the split —up of stock by the J.C.Penney Company immediately preceding the death of
<br />Harry C.Faidley, and subsequent to the date of his last will and testament.
<br />The Court finds that if all the claims were allowed, and that if the provisions contained in
<br />Paragraphs Fifth and Sixth were allowed, and dividends on the stock were allowed, that there would
<br />be no funds with which to pay the charitable legatees named in Paragraph Seventh of said last will
<br />and testament.
<br />That in order to settle and compromise said claims and disputes and to make some adjustment
<br />to the charitable legatees mentioned in Paragraph Seventh, Lloyd H.Faidley individually, Lloyd H.
<br />Faidley and The First National Bank of Grand Island, Nebraska, as executors, and Hollis Showalter,
<br />Executor of the Della Faidley Estate, entered into a written agreement dated December 10, 1940,
<br />which said agreement was heretofore ratified and ap ??roved by the Court, and which agreement is made
<br />a part of this decree.
<br />That Baid agreement was entered into upon the condition that the legatees mentioned in Paragraph
<br />Seventh of said last will and testament would accept fifty per cent. of the principal sum in full
<br />settlement of their legacies as follows:
<br />Christian Orphans' Home, St. Louis, Missouri, $2500.00 instead of $5000.00.
<br />Masonic Home, Fremont, Nebraska, $2500 instead of $5000.00,
<br />Nebraska Children's Home of Omaha, Nebraska., $2500.00 instead of $5000.00
<br />The Presbyterian Church of Grand Island, Nebraska, the sum of $1250.00, instead of $2500,
<br />then and in that event the parties to said agreement would perform all of the provisions of said
<br />agreement.
<br />The Court finds that said executors have complied with Paragraph Three of said last will and
<br />testament, that they have set apart for Della Faidley the real property constituting the residence
<br />at the time of the death of Harry C.Faidley, and described as follows:
<br />Lots Nine (9) and Ten (10) in Block Five (5) in Charles Wasmer's Addition to the city of Grand
<br />Island, in Hall County, state of Nebraska,
<br />and set apart and delivered to Della Faidley all of the personal prpperty mentioned in said
<br />Paragraph Third.
<br />The Court finds that Paragraph Fourth was impossible to perform, for the reason that the claims
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