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Lincoln Woman's Club v. City of Lincoln, supra, AFFIRMED. considering property used to learn about civic,national,and world government and as a site for instruction in bridge, "homemaking," book reviews, and lectures on Alcoholics Anonymous,held: [We have]said that education"may be particularly directed to either mental, moral or physical faculties, but in its broadest and best sense it embraces them all, and includes not merely the instructions received at school, college, or university, but the whole course of training--moral, intellectual, and physical." [Citing and quoting from Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite v. Board of County Commissioners,supra.] Lincoln Woman's Club v. City of Lincoln,supra,178 Neb.at 363,133 N.W.2d at 459. In substance,the County contends that activities occurring at group homes are merely incidental to operation of the facilities as a dormitory or residence for disabled persons. We cannot agree with the County's myopic view of the educational function found in the group homes. Education should not be determined by some quantitative analysis of a formal curriculum but may be measurable in reference to training received as reflected in an individual's enhanced behavior. In its most basic sense education is simply development,as fully as possible, of an individual's given capacity,preferably for desirable qualities. Because they are special people, the residents of the group homes receive special training--education--for life beyond Bethphage. Thus, the activities at the group homes are educational within the meaning recognized by this court in Ancient [381 N.W.2d 1701 and Accepted Scottish Rite v. Board of County Commissioners,supra. Bethphage does not distribute any of its income to its Page 891 members, directors, officers, or private individuals and, therefore, does not use its property for financial gain or profit.See United Way v.Douglas Co. Bd. of Equal., 215 Neb.1,337 N.W.2d 103(1983). We agree with the district court that Bethphage's property was exempt from taxation in 1983 as a result of its use for an educational purpose. We realize that the district court also held that Bethphage's property was used for a charitable purpose. However,the bases for exemption from taxation, pursuant to §77-202(1)(c), are stated in the disjunctive. Having determined that one of the uses enumerated in§77-202(1)(c)exempts Bethphage's property from taxation, unlike Browning, regarding an additional basis for exemption,we need not"count the ways."